The disappointing end of the Weimar Republic in the rise of National Socialism has inspired a broad body of scholarship on German militarism that downplays the influence of pacifism in German political culture. Historian Richard Bessel, for example, asserts that pacifism ''found no appreciable echo in Weimar politics.'' Furthermore, he argues it ''remains one of the most telling characteristics of the political culture of inter-war Germany that pacifism failed to make a significant impact after so awful and senseless an armed conflict. '' 1 Bessel pits the failure of pacifism against the appeal of militarism in Weimar Germany, emphasizing pacifists' marginal position in a political culture dominated by conservative institutions and the tacit acceptance of violence. Historian Jennifer Anne Davy addresses these arguments in her analysis of Weimar antimilitarists. Acknowledging the ''broad spectrum of [Weimar] political factions'' which embraced masculine and militaristic rhetoric, Davy draws attention to the urgent need to reevaluate the role of pacifism during the Weimar Republic.
2 Indeed, militarism comprised only one thread of continuity in a Weimar tapestry that also contained nationalism, communism, mainstream pacifism, Social Democracy, and international feminism. By emphasizing the dominance of militarism in Weimar political culture, Bessel and others obscure the significance of noncommunist Left-wing groups, many of which had rich foundations in the late nineteenth century and resurfaced as active participants in West Germany's post-World War II democracy.
This investigation focuses on four case studies of Weimar-era peace activism: the 1920s No-More-War (Nie-Wieder-Krieg) protests, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) international education courses, German Pacifist Student Union (Deutscher Pazifistischer Studentenbund-DPSt) public reading sessions from 1925 to 1927, and the 1927 transnational peace exhibit ''Peace Movements and Peace Activism in All Countries,'' which toured in five German cities. Each example represents a crossroads between national politics and transnational networks exemplified by individual efforts to participate in both arenas. 3 These educational events reflect the ambitions of pacifists, feminists, and Social Democrats to be proactive participants in Weimar political culture as they mobilized around issues of peace and established provisional traditions of cooperation between party and periphery groups.
NEGOTIATING WEIMAR POLITICAL SPACE I draw on a core ⁄ penumbra model developed by early modern historians Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones to better understand the complicated political relationship between pacifism and Social Democracy. 4 In their understanding, the core represented formal medical institutions in early modern France and the penumbra were formed by various healers, so-called quacks, and other social actors at the edge of the institutional core. The authors employ the term ''penumbra'' instead of ''periphery'' to emphasize permeability and exchange between the core and marginalized participants in the medical world. The noncommunist Left within Weimar political culture can be considered in similar terms. The core ⁄ penumbra model implies a constant intermingling of ideas, members, and strategies between formal party politics and grassroots activism. This framework facilitates the evaluation of Social Democrats, pacifists, and feminists within national political culture while at the same time, it emphasizes moments of cooperation and conflict between mainstream party members and supporters of grass-roots activism. Transnational networks and ideas also were more freely exchanged and fostered at the edge of the formal party system.
The complex relationship of the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands-SPD), commonly known as a ''peace party,'' to the peace movement makes the German Left a particularly suitable illustration for this new investigation into the development of transnational awareness within political culture. Though ideologically compatible, cooperation between pacifists and Social Democrats was often stymied by class and political tensions before and during the Weimar era. Dieter Riesenberger, for example, describes late nineteenth and early twentieth century tensions between the party and the predominantly bourgeois peace movement well. Riesenberger asserts that party leaders saw the Socialist Second International fundamentally as an ''anti-war movement.'' This point is reinforced by Wolfram Wette's observation that Social Democrats tended toward basically pacifist politics. Mutual distrust obstructed coordinated efforts between the two, however, and Riesenberger contends pre-World War I Social Democratic cooperation with bourgeois pacifists was simply not feasible. 5 Indeed, the party's subsequent votes for war credits revealed the distance between Social Democratic politics and peace politics during World War I. This conflict led independent Social Democrats, many of whom were pacifists, to split from the SPD and form the Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhä ngige Sozialdemokratische Deutschlands-USPD). The two parties remained separate until 1922, setting the institutional framework for the Weimar Left. 6 Although the official relationship between party and movement during the Weimar Republic remained tenuous, many individual pacifists recognized the SPD as the best chance for party political support. Traditional socialist commitments to international reconciliation and the fact that many pacifists sympathized with, or were members of, the SPD created a strong affinity and fostered exchange between the two groups. 7 In her study of women voters during the Weimar Republic, historian Julia Sneeringer usefully illustrates that ''[l]ived identities of gender, class, ethnicity, [and] age … are inherently unstable and constantly in competition, existing in a kind of overlapping simultaneity.'' 8 9 Although each activist came from a different social and political background, their behavior reveals significant exchange and cooperation among and between these Left groups and an interest in promoting transnational awareness in that focused arena. These four key activists highlight the changing dynamics between party and pacifists as well as sites of national and transnational tension, beginning with their activities in the No-More-War demonstrations and ending with the transnational peace exhibit in Munich.
PEACE POLITICS IN THE STREET
As a university student in Berlin, Freiburg, Giessen, and Leipzig between 1920 and 1924, Fabian navigated the permeable space between party and popular politics. Over the course of the Weimar period, he participated in No-More-War demonstrations, taught WILPF vacation courses, and was a member of the DPSt. He also became a member of the German Peace Society (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft-DFG), one of the largest pacifist organizations in Germany, when it was reestablished in 1919. While completing his thesis on the pacifist philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, Fabian recognized a link between pacifism and socialism which he applied in his own activism. 10 He emphasized a ''new beginning'' for the peace movement in 1919, which was augmented by a new purpose for Weimar pacifists. According to Fabian, the primary tasks for post-World War I activists were to combat the common prewar notion that military conflicts were inevitable and remind German citizens of the dangers of modern warfare-both tasks embraced by participants in the No-More-War rallies.
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Weimar activists staged No-More-War demonstrations on the anniversary of the outbreak of World War I in cities across Germany and in international venues. The first public demonstration occurred in Berlin on August 1, 1920, and participants from diverse pacifist organizations planned the event. Although the socialist parties did not officially endorse the 1920 rally, many SPD and USPD members supported No-More-War events by 1921. In fact, Riesenberger attributes the success of these subsequent rallies to the support of the SPD and USPD. 12 The annual protests, therefore, represent one prominent site where significant numbers of party members and pacifists interacted and core political support proved crucial for success. Between 100,000 and 200,000 individuals participated in the 1921 Berlin rally and approximately 500,000 demonstrated in solidarity across Germany. Fabian estimates 100,000 people packed around him in the Berlin Pleasure Garden (Lustgarten) for a demonstration that had ''international character and led to a highpoint of the international peace movement.'' 13 Photos of the Pleasure Garden support the accuracy of Fabian's description. They depict men and women packed shoulderto-shoulder in the approximately five acres between buildings, overflowing into the colonnade of the Old Museum and even standing on nearby statues. 17 Indeed, newspapers represented a critical publicity instrument for these popular demonstrations, fostering rich exchanges between core and penumbra. Just as in Brockliss and Jones's Habermasian interpretation of the French medical world, media played a key role in Weimar political culture. In Berlin, the main Social Democratic newspaper Vorwä rts advertised regularly for the No-More-War demonstration in the weeks prior to the 1921 rally, announcing on July 20 that Social Democrats from greater Berlin ''officially'' decided on ''active participation in the…. peace demonstration 'No-More-War!''' The author invited not only all comrades but ''all friends of the idea of international understanding'' to get involved. 18 This endorsement encouraged support for the fledgling peace demonstrations, which were already located on the margins of Weimar political culture.
As the demonstration date loomed closer, Vorwä rts printed various notices for participants including lists of demonstrations in other German cities and planned SPD speakers for the Berlin rally. A front-page article from July 24, 1921, describing preparations for both German and foreign rallies, is particularly telling. 19 The publicity committee's combination of German and English, such as ''Friedensmeeting,'' and repeated use of English words textually reflects a transnational awareness between the founders of the British ''No More War'' movement, among others, and the German ''Nie-Wieder-Krieg'' demonstrations.
The The relationship between the SPD and the numerous Weimar-era pacifist organizations nonetheless was capricious. Party leaders frequently focused attention on national political interests at the expense of pacifist goals. Peace historian Reinhold Lü tgemeier-Davin observes that despite early Social Democratic enthusiasm for the demonstrations, antimilitarist war veterans' groups gradually took responsibility for organization of the annual No-More-War rallies. Riesenberger attributes the SPD leaders' distance to internal tension over peace mobilization in the newly reunited party and thwarted Social Democratic efforts to expand their role in the No-More-War leadership.
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SPD historian Heinrich Potthoff chronicles programmatic shifts in party consciousness which occurred after the USPD joined the SPD in 1922. The 1925 Heidelberg party program reflected this merger with a renewed focus on class struggle and an increasingly ''Marxist tone.'' Potthoff suggests that after 1925 the SPD limited its political focus to the ''formal functions of democratic institutions'' and the ''defense'' of Weimar democracy to make the transition for former USPD members smoother. 22 Ultimately, leading Social Democrats turned their attention inward to the national political core and away from controversial extra-parliamentary pacifist activities in their efforts to preserve the democratic system, which was increasingly under threat.
The Heidelberg program represented party leaders' efforts to unite a broadened spectrum of rank and file Social Democrats under one universal agenda. Internal divisions remained and many Social Democrats continued to support the No-More-War protests. Although there was significantly less publicity for the 1922 rallies than in the previous year, Vorwä rts printed a notice from the eve of the event that declared the SPD ''convincingly in agreement'' with the No-More-War organizers. Reports also expressed enthusiasm for rallies in France and England. 23 This party endorsement linked the rallies to core political culture, lending further credibility to the cause. No-More-War maintained its momentum with demonstrations in more than 200 German cities in 1922. 24 In 1923, however, crisis struck both Germany and the No-More-War protests. French and Belgian troops occupied the critical Ruhr industrial region and were met by steady passive resistance from local workers. The war-devastated countries intended to force reparations from an already financially distressed German population. Passive resistance to this military intrusion had a heavy price. The continued stagnation of these main industrial, coal-producing regions crippled the economy, leading to inflation and extreme hardship for many Germans.
In this unstable climate, Social Democratic Interior Minister Carl Severing prohibited all public demonstrations and thereby severely limited No-More-War activities. A notice for the annual No-MoreWar rallies appeared on the second page of the July 26, 1923 edition of Vorwä rts. As a result of the prohibition, organizers reduced the mass No-More-War Berlin demonstrations of previous years to five small gatherings in closed venues and cancelled outdoor marches. Interested participants needed to pick up tickets distributed in threehour windows the preceding Friday and Saturday at each location.
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Although the tickets were free, this new system placed greater responsibility on individual demonstrators. They were now required to plan ahead, choose a venue, and make an additional trip for tickets. Reports in the British publication No More War noted the smaller German meetings were a stark contrast to the highly visible, and considerably more accessible, open-air demonstrations held in previous years. Vorwä rts announcements for the demonstrations in 1924 suggest a similar compartmentalized arrangement on both the traditional Sunday afternoon and the following Monday. This controlled environment did not, however, keep German No-More-War organizers from calling for ''rallies for world peace in all parts of the country.'' British reporters also drew attention to the participation of French, German, and English speakers in Berlin rallies. When the police superintendent prohibited Frenchman Paul Langevin from taking the stage at an indoor rally, demonstrators read his prepared speech aloud. 26 The physical meeting space for transnational pacifist activists was restricted, but their anti-war efforts continued to intrude into the wider realm of Weimar political culture.
The No-More-War legacy is both lasting and complex despite some historians' negative assessments. Lü tgemeier-Davin considers the No-More-War rallies a failed experiment. He argues that ''the peace question as an integration-moment for pacifists, republicans, socialists, and labor organizations'' was not successful. 27 Bessel also grounds his conclusions about the disappointing impact of pacifism on 28 These broad uses of the slogan received mixed reviews during the Weimar era. Quidde and mainstream pacifists balked at the broad anti-militarist pacifist message promoted by the No-More-War rallies. However, even Quidde admitted the general appeal of ''No More War'' lent a certain freshness to the greater pacifist cause, attracting younger participants like Fabian and Weyl. 29 The legacy of this dramatic collective political action remained alive until the final years of the Republic and even after World War II as participants fondly remembered it as a moment of idyllic international cooperation. 30 Although SPD support for organized peace activism like the NoMore-War demonstrations drastically diminished over the first half of the 1920s, individual Social Democrats continued to participate in transnational pacifist initiatives. The No-More-War movement provided pacifists with a visible outlet for their convictions. As the demonstrations lost support, organizations such as WILPF and DPSt filled the void with alternative educational programs that drew attention to the importance of peace and transnational cooperation. One of the most effective strategies was the organization of activities such as vacation courses, exhibits, and reading sessions. All three efforts encouraged German citizens, and first-time voters in particular, to participate in the new democracy and develop a political awareness that defied national boundaries.
FEMINIST AND PACIFIST NETWORKS IN ACTION
WILPF groups across Europe hosted international summer and vacation courses in an effort to promote domestic political participation, develop transnational networks, and instill a sense of urgency for international reconciliation among young people. Drawing on its rich tradition of international cooperation among women, WILPF provided a critical framework for pacifist and feminist activism, strengthening connections between German chapters and transnational networks by bringing activists together across national borders. 31 Historian Jo Vellacott cites interpersonal contacts established in nineteenth-century women's social and suffrage networks as playing a ''real and significant role in international understanding.'' 32 These networks, Vellacott argues, laid critical foundations for what she terms transnational WILPF networks at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. WILPF leaders built on this tradition of personal networks, organizing vacation courses that would serve as incubators for renewed transnational contact during the 1920s.
In 1923, Fabian and his future wife Dora Heinemann participated in WILPF vacation courses at the University of Geneva in Switzerland. 33 Fabian remembers this cross-border collaboration warmly, praising both the women's organizations and the DFG for ''cultivating international connections'' during the Weimar era. Colleague Detlef Oppermann's observation that Fabian's World War II exile experiences were comparatively smoother than others attests to the enduring strength of these connections. Oppermann attributes Fabian's comparable good fortune in exile to his contacts in the former Czechoslovakia, France, and Switzerland, which he nurtured through his Weimar ''political position.'' 34 WILPF courses provided participants such as Fabian with direct personal networking opportunities and fostered a spirit of transnational cooperation. British organizers described these activities best in 1921, dubbing their pedagogical ''experiment'' in Salzburg ''Education for Internationalism. '' 35 The Salzburg summer school was a success, attracting more than 300 participants from eight countries and territories, including Germany. Teachers conducted sessions in English, French, and German. Though no direct translations were available to students, linguistic diversity among the participants provided an opportunity to escape the boundaries of one of the most prominent symbols of individual national identity: native language.
36 German participant Gertrud Baer described her feelings about the Salzburg school declaring, ''International? The world today scoffs at the term and drags it through the mud-but for us it has a lighter, warmer tone; a source of energy for new action!'' The ''us'' in Baer's statement refers to the international group of summer school participants ''who got to know one another through their common task,'' revealing the strength of her identification with these transnational connections. 37 Baer's enthusiastic report attests to the success of the 1921 session and WILPF expanded offerings in 1922 to include Easter courses in England and two more summer schools, one of which was organized and hosted by the German WILPF branch at the Bavarian castle Lauenstein.
38 These courses were a welcome outlet for German students frustrated by the largely conservative and nationalist university environment of the Weimar period.
In light of this conservative university culture, Fabian describes the efforts of organizations like the DPSt to sway nonpolitical or conservative university students to the pacifist cause. To this end, Berlin DPSt leader Weyl incorporated transnational pacifist ideas into a successful series of Leseabende (reading sessions) held from 1925 until 1927. A woman of many interests, Weyl's personal biography provides insight into the behavior of a female pacifist Social Democrat in the Weimar Republic. Entangled in various networks of pacifists and socialists in a university environment that was rather unfriendly to both, Weyl worked diligently in pacifist organizations such as the DPSt and the League of Free Socialist Youth (Bund freier sozialistischer Jugend). As a leading student pacifist, she often represented both groups at German Peace Cartel (Deutsche Friedenskartell-DFK) meetings in the 1920s. 39 In a report on the 1925 ⁄ 1926 winter semester, DPSt national press officer Rudolf Kü stermeier recognized Weyl's deep commitment to the organization and her exceptional work. ''The best group is apparently Berlin,'' Kü stermeier claimed, ''where Gerda Weyl achieved promising improvements as deputy chairman, especially with her pacifist reading sessions. '' 40 The DPSt needed a rallying point in the turbulent scene of Weimar pacifism. In October 1924, Weyl participated in the DPSt Berlin Conference where the pacifist group formulated a tactical new program that embraced all students ''who fight against war as a crime and advocate international cooperation.'' 41 Roughly a year later, Weyl launched the first reading sessions, encouraging exchanges of information and ideas through a broad range of themed meetings. The series occurred at a critical moment in Weimar history and the history of the DPSt as an organization. The year 1926 marked Germany's acceptance into the League of Nations after years of negotiation and brought a surge in domestic media attention to its activities. 42 In the midst of these political dialogues, the Berlin DPSt group initiated reading sessions that addressed diverse issues ranging from international arbitration and peace to contemporary social tensions. The meetings were well-publicized and open to all, not just students. 43 Weyl's initiative was not the first instance of ideological grassroots education in the political penumbra. Historian Jean Quataert's work on early Social Democratic women's programs reveals that reading sessions organized by female Social Democrats in Berlin in the early 1900s were part of a ''long-standing commitment to continuous education for [the] rank and file.'' This ''education of all by all'' included guided discussions of works such as the Communist Manifesto and various programmatic documents of the SPD. 44 The Social Democratic tradition of ''Women's Meetings'' continued even after women gained the right to vote in 1919. These meetings took the form of organized lectures, reading sessions, and other alternative activities to general party meetings, which were characteristically not well attended by female members. 45 Weyl would have been familiar with the tradition as a young Social Democrat and through her mother, who participated in numerous Berlin Social Democratic women's clubs and social advocacy committees from the turn of the century through the Weimar period. Weyl's placement of the DPSt flier collection with her mother's papers at the Archive of Social Democracy suggests that she linked her own reading sessions with this common Social Democratic practice more explicitly than the documents alone reveal. 46 The use of the reading session tradition reflects the impact of Social Democratic women's culture on Weyl's activities as a young adult in the 1920s. It was part of her political experience, and this experience affected her daily actions. Although Weyl's sessions targeted a broader and more coeducational audience than traditional women's reading sessions, the focus was nevertheless the same: to convey the groups' message by encouraging an interactive educational experience apart from mainstream political and social rhetoric. These activities took advantage of emerging space in political culture and integrated ideas from core party politics as well as transnational pacifist and feminist networks in outlying political arenas.
Gertrud Eysoldt, a prominent actress, teacher, and radio announcer, kicked off the theme ''Comrades in Humanity'' in October 1926 with her lecture ''America and China.'' Between 1905 and 1934, Eysoldt taught over 2000 students at the German Theater Acting School and was extremely popular with young Berliners. In addition, her biographer, Carsten Niemann, notes that Eysoldt was enamored with new radio technology and was a regular broadcaster in the 1920s. Listeners could tune in to her programs in Germany as well as abroad. Niemann also describes Eysoldt's deep commitment to pacifism and her use of many different venues to promote peace in German society. 47 Although Eysoldt was a German actress, she drew many ideas from outside German national borders to promote peace and transnational awareness in her broadcasts in Berlin. Her background and deep commitment to peace connected her with DPSt goals, while her international reputation drew attention to the Berlin organization's efforts to promote peace by looking beyond national boundaries.
In preparation for Eysoldt's talk, the DPSt produced fliers in handy half-sheets to publicize the ''Comrades in Humanity'' event, purposefully highlighting Eysoldt's name in bold, red letters (see Figure 1 ). The DPSt counted on the actress's popularity to draw a large crowd and her enthusiasm for pacifism and the topic to keep up the momentum for the remainder of the series. 48 Weyl rode Eysoldt's coattails, scheduling her ''Comrades in Humanity: North and South'' session exactly two weeks after ''America and China.'' Two weeks later, Rolf Gä rtner delivered the third ''Comrades in Humanity'' installment entitled ''The New Russia takes Flight,'' building on the energy of the previous two events. 49 Such clever marketing strategies no doubt contributed to the impact of DPSt reading sessions as they sought to expand pacifist activism in Berlin.
Weyl's ''North and South'' discussion attests to her blending of pacifist, feminist, and transnational ideas in the reading sessions. The title itself suggests a broad nongeographical perspective and the flyer announced that Weyl read from Danish feminist author Karin Michaelis' work as well as from the correspondence of iconic Italian actress, Eleonora Duse. 50 In this evening session, Weyl encouraged the audience to look beyond German borders to women who challenged the status quo. Michaelis' famous work The Dangerous Age chronicles the life of a divorced woman at the turn of the century. Biographer Helen Sheehy declares that throughout her acting career Duse ''expanded the very idea of Woman'' and ''she revealed the immense gap between accepted ideas of woman and what a woman really was.'' 51 These iconic women represented a long tradition of feminist thinking on women's issues often considered private. Weyl drew on their legacies to establish dialogues across national borders based on shared values and to encourage German activists to look outside their own nation for inspiration. Her innovative use of Social Democratic tradition combined with an emphasis on pacifist, feminist, and socialist ideas contributed to the success of the Berlin DPSt in the mid-1920s and reveals the growing potential of peripheral political culture initiatives in Weimar democracy.
Weyl's use of the reading sessions was a distinct and promising effort to promote the goals of the 1926 DPSt program, which called for open international cooperation between students and academics of all countries. The DPST explicitly acknowledged its support of Weimar individual and group networks, advocating ''a basic reorganization of the relationships of individual person to individual person, group to group and country to country.'' The fourth program point declared support for the League of Nations and efforts to make it a ''true supranational working-group. '' 52 This point highlights DPSt members' desire to see the League become a more transnational rather than strictly international organization, a goal shared by many Social Democrats who envisioned the League as one of peoples rather than nations.
53 DPSt members and fellow pacifists, though limited to the periphery of political culture, structured their transnational ambitions carefully in an effort to bring cross-border collaboration and awareness into the larger national political arena. The 1927 Munich peace exhibit further demonstrates the success of transnational pacifist initiatives in breaking out from the limits of both national and political frameworks during the Weimar Republic.
TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKING ON DISPLAY
The 1927 peace exhibition entitled ''Peace Movements and Peace Activism in all Countries'' is perhaps the best indicator of the expanding transnational influences in German political culture. This Munich exhibit brought together material from all over the world and traveled to various cities throughout Germany. Hallgarten describes the perseverance of pacifist Marie Zehetmaier as the main catalyst for the project. Failing to gain support from the Munich DFK group, Zehetmaier appealed to Quidde as leader of the DFG because he had been out of town when her exhibit proposal was rejected as too costly.
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Zehetmaier's personal agency brought this transnational vision to fruition. With Quidde's aid, Zehetmaier gathered so much material from various international groups in her home that Hallgarten marveled at how she could live ''in such a tangled mass of paper.'' 55 The overwhelming enthusiasm and the speed with which Zehetmaier was able to collect project materials (less than one year) demonstrates the tight links between pacifist networks in Germany and abroad. As a member of the DFK, Hallgarten voted against Zehetmaier's 1926 proposal, yet she could not deny the mounting enthusiasm for the innovative exhibit from both German and international pacifist organizations.
Hallgarten herself represents an intriguing figure in Weimar political culture. A middle-class feminist as well as a pacifist, she insists in her autobiography that she never belonged to a political party. Her inclination toward socialism is documented, however, especially at the beginning of the Weimar period when she was a member of the League of Socialist Women (Bund Sozialistischer Frauen). In addition, her biographers note that she voted socialist in the 1919 elections even though her husband voted democratic. Hallgarten's participation in the 1919 WILPF Zü rich Conference directly after the war, despite extreme financial hardship and difficult traveling conditions, also demonstrates her dedication as an international activist. In addition, she represented the DFK at the first Munich No-More-War demonstration in 1922, enthusiastically noting the participation of American pacifists in her memoirs. 56 Hallgarten's activities reveal the extent to which transnational and national political culture intersected in the Weimar era.
The idea for a peace exhibit may have been initiated through the individual efforts of pacifists such as Zehetmaier, Hallgarten, and Quidde, but the trio's combined connections to larger pacifist networks helped make the exhibition a success. Hallgarten reached out to Munich leaders for support and was surprised to find that of the two main religious groups, Catholic officials were more likely to support the initiative than Lutheran. In fact, Hallgarten, a member of the Lutheran church, was deeply disappointed by the intense negative reaction of the clergymen, one of whom mocked not only the idea of peace to her face, but the League of Nations as well. 57 Interestingly, Hallgarten attributed this difference to a Catholic predisposition to be internationally minded based on the church's supranational structure as opposed to the national structure of the Lutheran church. She surmised that Catholic officials transcribed positive experiences from wider church frameworks to the proposed transnational German peace exhibit and therefore supported the effort. Here, Hallgarten shows a keen awareness of differences between transnational and national perspectives in her own political activities.
Although the Munich DFK officially declined the project, many of its member organizations participated. The three largest exhibit rooms reflected complementary involvement of the DFG, WILPF, and Zehetmaier's religious pacifist organization as main Munich sponsors. 58 Contributions for the displays came from all over the world. After an entrance exhibit illustrating the costs and horrors of World War I through photographs, artwork, and graphic statistical charts, the organizers dedicated a room solely to the League of Nations. The League's Information Section provided extensive materials highlighting its international organization as well as past, present, and future diplomatic work. DFG organizers hoped the League's prominent place in the exhibit would be thought-provoking for visitors and simultaneously pressure League officials to develop the body into ''a true instrument of peace,'' something that many Weimar pacifists, including the DPSt as noted above, advocated. 59 The first room reflected Weimar pacifists' efforts to remind Germans of the horrific war and the second advocated a solution.
The peace exhibit prominently displayed and celebrated critical moments where pacifists reached across national borders and accepted so-called enemies without prejudice. One way participants in supranational networks demonstrated their international consciousness, according to the historian Leila Rupp, was to ''reach out to those [who were] supposed to be … enemies.'' 60 WILPF members' efforts to bridge national animosity with personal acts of symbolic ''sisterhood'' are well-documented in Rupp's Worlds of Women.
61 A poster captioned ''Women from 'Enemy' Countries Meet in Zurich in May 1919'' from the exhibit reinforces the point (see Figure 2) . It displayed a collage of photographs taken at the 1919 WILPF meeting and further emphasized the lasting impact of these conscious acts of transnational cooperation as well as the pride felt by participants. 62 At the time, women from across the globe had gathered in Zurich to protest the harsh peace treaty terms simultaneously under discussion in Versailles. Vellacott emphasizes the contrast between the female Hague delegates in 1919 brought together by ''a shared and terrible experience of war'' and the statesmen at Versailles. Instead of focusing on preventing war, these men ''thought in terms of retribution, of gains, of enforcement, of maintaining the upper hand,'' Vellacott argues. ''[I]ndividually, each worked for the perceived advantage of his own country.'' 63 WILPF delegates to the 1919 meeting built upon foundations laid by the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace at The Hague, and their feminist networks remained grounded in the same spirit of conscious transnational cooperative action throughout the Weimar period. 64 The poster's designers captured this moment of purposeful female solidarity, presenting photographs of women from various countries, including prominent German personalities Anita Augspurg, Lida Gustava Heymann, and Hallgarten. The photos vividly display transnational interpersonal contact by including women of several nationalities as subjects (see Figure 3) . The emphasis was the product of conference participants' efforts to demonstrate international female solidarity in 1919 as well as the pride of Hallgarten and exhibit organizers to illustrate this moment of true transnational cooperation. After all, Vellacott reiterates, ''war requires an enemy, and it is hard to consider as enemies those you know well.'' 65 The poster format was a conscious demonstration of transnationalism in both moments, one example of many throughout the exhibit.
The focal point of the peace exhibit, a large sarcophagus, represented another symbol of purposeful transnational solidarity among the displays. In Munich, the casket ''ruled'' the stage of the exhibit hall where Quidde, a transnationally recognized figure, had laid a golden laurel wreath on it. A nearby sign displayed the words ''To all 67 By 1927, however, Quidde boldly used this symbol to invoke a sense of common experience and brotherhood with foreign soldiers and their families. The sarcophagus featured in several DFG announcements for the exhibit, with authors often stressing the transnational solidarity represented by the display. Quidde's efforts were meant to have visual shock value as well as educational merit, causing Germans to think about similarities between themselves and victims of war in every nation.
Despite DFK misgivings, the peace exhibit was a hit, launching from its Munich base and traveling in 1927 and 1928 to the German cities of Wü rzburg, Erfurt, Harburg, and Dresden. The exhibit drew many school classes, and visitors came ''again and again'' to view the displays. 68 What started as a local pacifist's vision of bringing transnational awareness to Munich transformed into a national exhibit, which itself attracted notice within and beyond German borders.
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This exhibit was indeed a site of transnational exchange in German political culture. It represents a rich moment of cooperation between pacifists, Social Democrats, and feminists as they worked together to bring transnational awareness to their own regions.
Gerhart Seger, the General Secretary of the DFG and later SPD representative to the Reichstag, traveled from Berlin to help prepare the exhibit and generate publicity. Seger also spoke on the destructive potential of future wars in the evening lecture series held in tandem with the Munich exhibition. 70 Although the lecture series poster did not explicitly identify Seger with the SPD, his presence and participation suggest that party officials did not actively block him from publically supporting a pacifist agenda. In fact, Seger was not unique. Reports in the WILPF publication Vö lkerversö hnende Frauenarbeit from December 1928 claimed that Dresden WILPF members, many of whom were Social Democrats, brought the peace exhibition to their city. In the same report, the WILPF group in Darmstadt boasted of great support for their publicity campaigns from Social Democratic publicists. 71 Even though the SPD withdrew official support from peace organizations in the mid-1920s, individual party members maintained connections between formal politics and penumbra political activities in the pursuit of peace.
POLITICAL LITMUS TEST
Despite these examples of cooperation and intersection, the pacifist milieu and Social Democracy were put to the test in 1928. After an intense election campaign that promised ''food for children'' instead of funding for new Panzerkreuzer (battleships), Social Democratic cabinet members turned their backs on the campaign promise and their own party colleagues. The ministers supported the ship construction project, believing they had made a logical compromise by allowing the battleships to be built and preserving political harmony in a fragile coalition government.
72 SPD historian Donna Harsch observes, however, that the ''decision unleashed a storm of protest in the SPD more intense than any since the [1918 ⁄ 1919] revolution.'' A key part of Social Democrats' disappointment in their ministers derived from the recent 1928 election campaign against rearmament. SPD candidates from all levels jumped on the controversial issue, fueling the fire with slogans critiquing battleship supporters' efforts to prioritize funds for weapons over the basic needs of the population. The campaign was in large part successful, gaining the SPD more than twenty new Reichstag seats. There was a strong pacifist presence in the party by 1928, in part thanks to the merger with the USPD, and peace historian Karl Holl notes that the majority of organized pacifism rejected the proposed battleships. 74 Harsch evaluates the general appeal of the slogan, stating that it added ''spice'' to SPD propaganda and tapped into the ''antimilitarism [that] was a potent ingredient in the Social Democratic worldview. '' 75 Campaign rhetoric drew attention to party antimilitarism and social welfare concerns during the election, intensifying the contrast between campaign promises and the ministers' actions once in office.
Outcry from all ranks of the SPD and peace organizations flooded newspapers and dominated meeting minutes within days of the battleship vote. Pacifist convictions as well as a strong belief in party discipline and upholding electoral promises drove many party members and supporters to denounce the decision and demand greater accountability for the SPD ministers' actions. Social Democrats, pacifists, and feminists who had collaborated successfully on Weimar educational and protest activities were outraged by this controversy. Fabian called for the SPD to leave the governing coalition and mobilize popular political opposition against the battleship construction akin to the NoMore-War protests. 76 In a DFG press release outlining the group's objections, secretary Seger declared the decision not only represented ''the beginning of rearmament'' but was ''a slap in the face of the voting masses. '' 77 The SPD ministers' decision was severely disillusioning from the perspective of many party sympathizers and members. Pacifist Social Democrat Heinrich Strö bel fumed that the incident revealed ''all the [Social Democratic] disarmament and No-More-War talk'' as ''blue smoke and world peace as a soap bubble.'' 78 In addition, grassroots education efforts meant to empower new voters were all for naught if elected leaders ignored those newfound voices. True to Fabian's call for popular protest, pacifist groups organized public events in the weeks after the crisis began. The DFK organization, the German League for Human Rights, for example, hosted an event entitled ''Panzerkreuzer, the People's Will and the Government'' on August 24.
79 These dissident voices, fostered by the sustained promotion of transnational awareness, culminated in demands for a people's referendum to take matters into their own hands.
Intense reactions to the battleship scandal were not limited to the political penumbra. Party members across the ranks were equally outraged by the actions of their ministers. The 1929 Magdeburg party meeting was fraught with arguments that party discipline had broken down and the ministers were out of line. Cabinet member Hermann Mü ller claimed he never personally uttered the much-criticized campaign promise. Other speakers passed the blame around from the ministers to party opposition, and even to the voters who did not muster enough support to create a cabinet with a Social Democratic majority. 80 Despite these disagreements, representatives at the meeting produced the ''Guidelines for Military Policies'' (Richtlinien zur Wehrpolitik). The guidelines emphasized the SPD's position against war as an instrument of diplomacy and sought the democratization of the League of Nations. Social Democrats envisaged the diplomatic organization as a league of peoples rather than a league of states so that it could become an ''effective instrument of peace.'' Defensively, the guidelines reaffirmed SPD foundations in transnational ideas of international socialism stating, ''[s]ocialism is the power that will bring the world lasting peace. '' 81 Many historians cite the battleship scandal as a massive breakdown in SPD party organization and, especially for Harsch, one moment that could be considered the beginning of the end for Social Democrats in the Weimar Republic. The scandal represents much more than inner-party strife and the breakdown of party and pacifist cooperation, however. The outcry against the ministers' decision from all corners of the German Left is particularly telling. As Potthoff notes, SPD leaders began to look inward for solutions to broader problems of Weimar democracy after 1925. They failed to consider that pacifism and international understanding had become a common language among many participants in core and penumbra political culture as well as national and transnational networks. The issue even attracted attention outside German borders. Dutch Social Democrat Dr. Johan Willem Albarda wrote to Mü ller about the reaction to the scandal in the Netherlands: ''[w]hen we held a number of demonstrations for disarmament on September 16 the streets were covered with huge signs with Panzerkreuzer!'' 82 The scandal, therefore, can be seen as a litmus test for subtle changes in political consciousness on the German Left. It reveals expanding transnational awareness in the national arena and sites of tension between SPD leaders and individual activists. Furthermore, the scandal illustrates the impact of national events beyond delineated borders.
CONCLUSION
This examination of pacifists, Social Democrats, and feminists reveals that the ''echo'' of pacifism in Weimar political culture is worth further consideration. Fueled by wartime experiences, these social actors built on pre-existing transnational networks and embraced ideas, awareness, and cooperation from beyond national borders. SPD members such as Fabian, Seger, and Weyl openly participated in pacifist activities, exchanging ideas, developing transnational connections, and, as Baer proclaimed, rallying around a sense of international responsibility. Their participation in pacifist initiatives opened up new political space in Weimar politics, normalizing cooperation between Social Democrats and pacifists through individual interaction. The battleship scandal refocused attention on a key problem for Social Democratic leaders: voter awareness was evolving and they needed to acknowledge the impact of these changes, including increasing transnational pacifist influences, to be effective in the political arena. The peace party was once again in conflict with its constituency.
Eerily similar to the party truce over war credits, political tensions in 1928 triggered a limited, and in the eyes of pacifists, empty response from SPD leaders, who turned inward for the sake of party stability rather than recognizing increasingly effective grassroots efforts to shape Weimar political culture. In stark contrast, initiatives such as the NoMore-War protests, WILPF vacation courses, DPSt reading sessions, and the 1927 peace exhibition promoted transnational networks and cooperation in an environment notorious for fostering rising nationalism and militarism before 1933. These case studies reveal a visible layer of pacifist activity in the Weimar Republic that has been obscured by scholarly attention to the rise of National Socialism and the collapse of the Republic. Despite increasing limits on political activism, the development of new political space between core and periphery fostered by individual cooperation on the Left during the Weimar Republic helped lay the groundwork for transnational interaction and peace politics in postwar German political culture. 3. These crossroads are the primary focus of my analysis and provide insight into a specific cross-section of German political culture. An overview of the complexities of Weimar political culture as a whole is beyond the scope of this article. I define transnational as a descriptive term which refers to interand non-governmental networks, ideas, contacts, and organizations active outside the boundaries of a single nation-state. Historical transnational analysis pursues an awareness and recognition of these supranational forces as factors which affected social actors and their immediate environment at critical moments in history. 
